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PUBLIC OPINION AND GOVERNMENT POLICIES
IN SAUDI ARABIA

Less than a hundred years ago, Saudi Arabia consisted of different tribes and different regions that lacked any form of political cohesion. After unifying the country, the late King Abdulaziz was faced with the no less daunting task of nation building; how to induce antagonistic regions, warring tribesmen and hostile villagers to bury the hatchet and come together as one nation with shared objectives and common interests. But despite the passing of years, traditional loyalties and associations, tribal, regional and sectarian, still run deep.

The history of the Saudi State is intrinsically linked to the Wahhabi creed and to Najd, its geographical and political center. But If you were to talk to Saudis from outside of Najd you would sense a tinge of simmering resentment for what they consider to be the cultural hegemony of Najd and the imposition of its Wahhabi version of Islam. Najd is rather poor, economically and culturally, compared to other regions in the Kingdom. The wealth of the Kingdom comes mainly from the oil fields in the Eastern Province. However, a good percentage of the population in that province are ShiÕa. The sectarian tension between ShiÕa and Wahhabis is as exasperated as that between Catholics and Anabaptists.

On the other hand, the Hijazis think that it is pilgrimage to the two holy shrines in Mekkah and Madinah that, in addition to providing a good portion of the stateÕs annual revenue, gives the Kingdom the unique and leading position it enjoys in the Muslim World. Furthermore, Hijaz had a long history of self-rule under the Sharifs and it has always been a center of learning, therefore, it is considered more advanced culturally than Najd. Due to the flux of annual pilgrims to Hijaz from all corners of the world and due to its long contacts with Egypt and Syria, the Hijazis enjoy a more urbane and open outlook on life, therefore, they feel ill at ease with the way they are subjected to the strict Wahhabi doctrine.

Until recently, nomads constituted a large percentage of the total population. The remaining were mainly settled villagers and cultivators. The relation between the two groups was a combination of economic complementarity on the one hand and socio-political antagonism on the other. In the past, the nomads constituted, due to their military advantage and possession of means of mobility in the forms of camels and horses, the nobility of the desert who lorded it over villagers and cultivators. But in the present situation, they are at a great disadvantage. They lost their military superiority over the townspeople. Illiteracy is very high among the Bedouins and they disdain manual labor and look at it as something below their dignity. The social stratification in Saudi Arabia is further complicated by the fact that despite the prejudice of settlers against the nomads, a settler who cannot trace his genealogical descent to an aristocratic nomadic tribe is considered lacking in nobility. Nontribal folks cannot intermarry with those who can claim tribal descent.

Such tribal, regional and sectarian divisions run through and override most official associations, sometimes hindering their proper functioning and rendering them less efficient.

The regime is well aware of all these points of social disarticulations and the usefulness of using them as checks and balances against one another in order to create a sort of political equilibrium and rise above them as the ultimate and necessary arbiter. Keeping such discordancies simmering but under control hinders the creation of any viable national consensus which would lead to any sort of concerted political action on the popular level.

Popular uprising has never posed a credible threat in the Arab World. By reviewing recent Arab history we would see that the most serious challenge posed to traditional regimes was the threat of military coups. But in Saudi Arabia such a threat is rather remote because the various branches of the security forces are counter poised one against the other with each under the command of a senior member of the royal family. The military conscripts are drawn mainly from the settled hadhar population, the National Guards from the Bedouin population, and the internal security and police forces are mixed with the majority coming from the Southern Province. Such arrangement and heterogeneous composition undermine any combined action by these forces. Anyway, the Gulf Arabs generally have become disillusioned and disenchanted with military juntas, revolutionary projects and Pan-Arab nationalist rhetoric of the last century. What the average Saudis worry most about is the possibility of division within the ruling house, especially with the problem of succession looming large as the sons of King Abdulaziz get older and the second generation prepares to take over with no clear rules laid out for this risky game. This is the more serious given the various points of social disarticulations I just mentioned which could be seized upon by different contenders, given the fact that, as I mentioned, each of the various branches of the security forces are under the command of a senior member of the royal family who usually passes it on to one of his sons. Added to this is the fact that every one of the seven major provinces of Saudi Arabia is also under the governorship of a senior member of the royal family.

Another impediment to collective political action on the popular level is the prevalent traditional conception of the nature of the relationship between ruler and ruled. This relationship is not governed by a social contract with clearly stated and mutually binding legal codes and constitutional precepts so much as by vague mutual obligations couched in patriarchal and paternalistic outlook. The ruler is a patriarch and the people are his children. Any outward disagreement on the part of a subject is conceived as parallel to showing disobedience and disrespect to a paternal authority figure. Any criticism could convey the wrong message to the outside world, a message that the house is divided and, by implication, weak. Any grievance regarding the performance of the regime should be communicated to the ruler in his majlis or submitted in a written letter addressed discretely to the proper channels without broadcasting such a grievance to the outside world. The ruler, no doubt, should be sensitive to public opinion, but only as long as that opinion does not challenge his authority. Consideration of public opinion is not so much yielding to public pressure as it is motivated by benevolence and a sense of duty of ruler to ruled as stipulated by Islam.

This patriarchal conception of political authority is buttressed by the dominant official religious ideology that disapproves of any outward show of civil dissent and lends no provision to popular suffrage. According to this ideology, the function of a ruler is mainly to insure security for his people and their property, provide for the needy and maintain law and order according to Islamic ethical principles. Administering justice according to shariÕah, the legal Islamic principles, is the backbone of political legitimacy.

According to the Wahhabi unitarian view, the society is held together not so much by complimentary associations and mutual interdependencies, but by binding sentiments and common belief, a collective consciousness. It is based not on utilitarian and expedient considerations, but on the organization of human sentiments into implicit convictions. No one is allowed to leave the fold or swerve from the right path followed by the community of the faithful, the Ôummah. Any alternative stand is treated as a deterioration from the pristine, original archetype of the time of the prophet. The archetype is a model to be emulated and reproduced, not dissected or scrutinized.

The concept of Ôummah is loaded with familial connotations. The jural aspects of the relationships and obligations of citizens to one another and to the ruler are articulated in familial terms and built around status rather than contract. To fudge the political and merge it with the social relieves the state from elaborating viable, efficient political institutions and legally accountable apparatus with clearly defined responsibilities. This pushes the citizen back into the traditional loyalties of locality and tribe. He is living in an impersonal crowded urban setting, yet he is supposed to operate and run his daily business according to rural, traditional, small community, face-to-face principles. To deal with such challenges, which are compounded by institutional inefficiency, the citizen is forced to reduce all jural and administrative problems he faces to the level of personal affairs. He attaches himself as the clientele of an influential figure of his tribe or locale with wide network and good connections who would be his patron, or waastah, to look after him and help him get what actually should have been his right as a citizen.

The alliance of the ruling elite with the clerical class gives the latter a great leverage in social and political affairs. As a matter of fact, any approval or disapproval of a government decision has to be couched in a religious language to give it any weight or credence. One may dare oppose a political decree but it would be heretical and suicidal to oppose a religious fatwa. Whenever the government wishes to thwart or abort public opposition to any domestic or foreign policy it resorts to the Council of Grand Religious Ôulama to issue a religious fatwa endorsing such a policy, as it did when it wanted to invite the ÒinfidelÒ American soldiers to liberate Kuwait, or when it asked for a fatwa against terrorist groups or against the take over of the Grand Mosque by Juhaiman. This alliance with the clerical class puts the regime in a delicate position regarding its efforts to combat fundamentalists and extremists. It is intent on crushing them but it does not wish to convey the feeling that by taking harsh measure against the fundamentalists it is taking those measure against the religion of the people.

As a matter of fact, the clerics are the only well established professional class in the Arab World with historical roots, which go a long way back in history, with articulated discourse, substantial literature and a broad public base. They meet with millions of devotees five times a day at the five daily prayers. This is in contrast, for example, to liberals and intellectuals who are powerless and ineffectual because they do not express the interest of any social class. At the close of the 18th century, the liberal voice in Europe was expressing the interest of the rising class of the merchants and the bourgeoisie in their struggle against the nobility and the feudal lords. The merchant class in the Gulf Region, has a completely different story to tell. All traditional sultanates, emirates, chieftains and peti-states in the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf Region were established by merchant families. The revenue from merchandise gives them their material base, while their alliance with the clerical class give their political and legal authority the necessary legal justification. This shows the political and religious roots of mercantilism in the Gulf Region and the intertwining of the merchant class with the ruling class and the religious class. This leaves the intellectuals and liberals out of the show, with no role to play, at least up till now.

Being in league with the ruling class, any liberalization of the laissez faire type might hurt the merchants more than benefits them, since it could break their monopolies. They draw their wealth mainly from trade and lucrative government contracts, more than from industry and entrepreneurship. Since ancient times, the wealth of the Gulf merchants is export/import with no industrial base.

Aside from the clerical class and the merchant class, tribal elements also are staunch supporters of the regime. Political alliance between the regime and present tribal leaders goes back to the early days of unification. Tribal leaders who resisted the hegemony of King Abdulaziz or allied themselves to opposing powers such as the Othmans or Sharif Husayn of Hejaz were routed and deposed and a new leadership was installed who owe their position and allegiance to the House of Al Saud. Continuing largess and patronage keep this loyalty active. Insuring the loyalty of a tribal chief would insure the loyalty of the whole tribe.

Tribes, Clerics, and to a certain extent merchants are the only organized groups who, each as an independent and discrete block, could act to influence government decisions, mainly with regard to domestic policies and in a rather timid way.

Fragmentation of public opinion and lack of national consensus due to the social divisions alluded to above, in addition to absence of professional syndicates, labor unions, and associations of civil societies make it difficult for popular voice to gather strength and rise to a perceptible momentum that could exercise any political pressure on government decisions, especially when it comes to foreign policy, which is more and more becoming of lesser concern to the Arab masses in general. The young Saudis are not so preoccupied with foreign policy as with domestic issues and the running of their daily affairs. Within the last few decades, Saudi Arabia has been going through an unprecedented demographic explosion whereby people under the age of 25 years constitute the greater percentage of the population. The average size of a nuclear family is soaring somewhere between 8 to 12 individuals. High rate of unemployment coupled with inflation and high rents and high prices of commodities puts high financial strain on families with average income. The low quality of the curriculum does not equip university graduates with the necessary skills and qualifications to compete successfully in the job market and start successful careers. The main concern of the people now is to see a more equitable division of national wealth so that the whole population of the country are given a fair and even chance to share in this wealth. They want to see that granting of lucrative contracts as well as high government posts are awarded according to merits and qualifications and not according to family connections.

Furthermore, there is a growing feeling among all sectors of the Saudi society that the present regime might not be ideal but the alternative could be much worse and would eventually lead to anarchy. None of the regimes in the recent history of the Middle East offers an attractive or a better alternative. Nowadays, the average Saudi would not relish a Qadhdhaafi style, or even a Khomeini style revolution. This feeling is fortified by recent moves by the Saudi regime to introduce some measures of moderate social reforms and a semblance of freedom of expression.

Disappointment with surrounding political experiences in the recent history of the Middle East, disenchantment with Pan Arab nationalistic ideologies, concern with more pressing domestic issues, apprehension concerning internal economic and social development; all these factors have pushed interest in foreign policy to the back burners in the minds of the average Saudi. Popular stands on foreign affairs, such as the situation in Iraq or an attack on Iran, are taken not so much from an ideological vantage point as from how they would reflect on the local economy and social stability, given the fact that a good percentage of the Saudi population are shiÕa.

Constraints on Saudi foreign policy, if there are any constraints, are external rather than internal. The image the kingdom wishes to convey to the outside world as home of the two holiest Muslim shrines and as leader of the Muslim World put on her certain responsibilities regarding foreign policy matters affecting the Arab and Muslim World. The Saudis need to establish credibility with Arab and Muslim nations as much as with Arab and Muslim governments.

Saudi Arabia, which Ðsince the days of the late King FaisalÐ has focused its attention on the Muslim World, is now fortifying its position and moving perceptibly towards a more intensely regional focus. The kingdom is clearly emerging as a key player in the regional politics of the Middle East. The waning influence of Egypt, the international isolation of Syria, and the current weakness of Iraq have thrown much of the burden of putting the Arab house in order, onto Saudi Arabia.

King Abdullah would seem to be well-placed to steer this shift. Since his days as second deputy prime minister during the reign of King Khalid, he has been among the most active of the senior Saudi royals in championing Arab causes. During the reign of King Fahad he regularly carried out the difficult mission of trying to rein in the belligerent policies of Assad of Syria and Saddam of Iraq. Most importantly, perhaps, is that it is his plan for peace with Israel Ðsubmitted to the Arab summit in Beirut in 2002Ð which has been accepted by the Arab countries and dubbed ÔThe Arab plan for peace in the Middle EastÕ. This is the second peace initiative offered by the Saudis to the Israelis, the first was submitted by late king Fahad to the Fez summit in 1982. That initiative was substantially the same as the one submitted to the Beirut summit in 2002, which was put back on the table during the last summit held in Riyadh in March 2007. Livni, along with Olmert, are sending some positive, though very faint signals regarding the Arab piece initiative, perhaps with a strong nudge from the USA. There are even rumors circulating here and there that the Saudis are in contact with the Israelis, most likely through third party liaison, regarding the Arab piece initiative, and it is said that this is motivated by the joint fear of both countries from the rising Iranian threat. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Arab World have never been more disposed towards peace with Israel as they are now, but lack of decisive leadership in Israel and the unconditional support of the US make peace very difficult. It is worth noting that the summit of 2007 was the first Arab summit ever to be held in Riyadh, another sign of the growing regional role of the kingdom.

Within the past few years Saudi Arabia has been quite successful in fighting terrorism, as well as having achieved unprecedented economic growth and significant foreign investment outside the oil and gas sectors. The coming years promise to bring unparalleled growth and development, huge public works projects with huge budgets having been announced, and some already having been started.

However, the Saudi regime is well aware that the political stability and economic prosperity of the kingdom as well as combatting the tide of terrorist rhetoric depend to a large extent on the political stability of the region. Regional unrest could frustrate the ambitious development and modernization projects in Saudi Arabia. Conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon are also fomenting sectarian tension between Sunni and Shia, which is a major concern for Saudi Arabia owing to the kingdom being home to a large Shia minority. The situation could be further aggravated by an attack on Iran, especially if Israel takes an active part in such an attack. This would put the kingdom in an extremely delicate position not so much with its own people, but with the whole Muslim World.

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